Kyle's Blog

Cover Songs

2010-01-26T00:32:00.002Z

Cover songs tend to have a poor reputation, and probably for good reason because they rarelt mount to anything more than karaoke.

Just occasionally a cover song manages to be superior to the original. Here are some examples (in no particular order) off the top of my head:

Hallelujah, Jeff Buckley (original by Leonard Cohen)

Wild is the Wind, Nina Simone (original by Johnny Mathis)

Hurt, Johnny Cash (originally by Nine Inch Nails)

Nothing Compares 2 U, Sinead O'Connor (originally by Prince)

There must be others. Any suggestions to add to the list?

A Problem for Consequentialism

2010-01-24T00:41:00.004Z

Consequentialism is a group of ethical theories that claim that what makes an action good or bad is its consequences.

Here is a problem for such a view:

Suppose you are on a walk with a group of friends you know very well. You come across a a person drowning in a river, and there is a lifebelt nearby. Should you try to save her? Well, the consequences seem good: you will save her life. The only negatives appear very minor: perhaps the loss of time and other things that do not seem worth considering.

However, consider doing nothing. Will she die? Well, you know your friends very well and have very good reason to think that they will save her. In fact, it seems that the consequences will be the same whether you act or not.

So, according to consequentialism you have no more reason to save the person than to do nothing. But surely it is irrelevant that your friends might save the person. If you see someone drowning then you have a reason to try to save that person, and a reason not to do nothing, regardless of whether you have friends with you who are likely to act.

There are possible responses to this. I will try to discuss some in future posts.

Returning

2010-01-19T23:36:00.003Z

It's been a very long time since my last post.

Since then I've completed my degree in Philosophy - I got a Distinction! Woo!

I now have a job, and much less time for blogging, but I will try to get back into it (we'll have to wait and see how long that lasts). I may do some posts about some of the things I wrote about in my dissertation, I may also do some non-philosophy posts.

Particularism

2009-08-09T22:09:00.003+01:00

An internalist about knowledge is someone who believes that when a person S has knowledge, then S has cognitive access to the basis of knowledge and why it is a good basis. This basis will be a reason, or experience or some other piece of knowledge. According to the internalist S's belief b is knowledge iff:

1. the belief p has feature q

2. beliefs with the feature q are usually true

3. S is aware of 1 and 2

However, 3 is also something that must be known, so it too must meet these requirements. That will lead to an infinite regress because to know something S will have to know something else. The problem with this method is that it seeks to begin the search for knowledge using some criteria, but any croteria will always be more doubtful than our most strongly held beliefs.

Therefore one should adopt a particularist method: taking those beliefs that seem to oneself to be good candidates for being knowledge and noting in what circumstances they do and do not seem reasonable. No doubt there will be disagreement, so it is important to understand that these examples are revisable. One can then make inferences based on the examples and check for consistency. Using conclusions and reflections to revise the examples, and come up with some working criteria of knowledge.

It is obvious from the history of philosophy that there has been much more agreement over items of knowledge such as basic empirical beliefs, belief in the past, in other minds, mathematical beliefs, and to a lesser extent ethical beliefs. Criteria for knowledge on the other hand have been much more varied, and rarely seem acceptable without persuasive argument. For this reason we should continue gathering examples of knowledge in the hope that it will lead us to a better understanding of the correct criteria.

What is the skeptical attitude?

2009-08-06T23:23:00.003+01:00

I trust he considers this skeptical attitude to be fully justified.

The above is taken from Sam Harris' article against Francis Collins here.

What is the skeptical attitude? I must admit I'm not very sure. The 'New Atheists' and other closely related atheists constantly sing its praises, but I've never come across a clear explanation of it. If you are aware of one please let me know.

The following may be foolish, but I'm going to try and guess what it might mean:

The Skeptical Attitude: To believe only those things that are seen to be probable from the evidence, and to hold such things with a level of certainty in proportion to the support provided by that evidence.

What is permitted to count as evidence. This is not a trivial matter, since if the skeptical attitude is to take us anywhere there must be some evidence, and there must be a way of telling what is and is not evidence. Presumably there is a basic kind of evidence that does not rely on further evidence, otherwise how will this use of evidence get off the ground?

Many philosophers have suggested candidates. For example, the John Locke and Rene Descartes would have said that we must begin only with those things that are either self-evident, like truths of logic and with beliefs about ones own mental life such as 'it appears as if there is a computer before me'. Other philosophers have allowed what is evident to the senses to count as basic evidence as well, such as 'there is a computer before me'. No matter, lets be generous and allow it all.

The evidence constraint (EC): All evidence must consist in or be derived from what is self-evident, what is about ones own mental life and what is evident to the senses.

I should note that we have now moved far away from what I am confident is meant by the skeptical attitude (my request for more information was not purely rhetorical).

The EC represents what Alvin Plantinga has called Classical Foundationalism, and he has a devastating argument against it:

Why think that what is contained in the EC is all that can count as evidence? That is, why think that it is true? Well, why don't we look at the evidence?

Firstly, is the EC one of those things that is basic? Well, it is not self-evident - I see no problem in denying it. It is not about a person's mental life, and it is certainly not evident to the senses. So, it's not basic. But maybe we can construct an argument based on these sorts of things. I know of no argument, and I cannot see where one would start. But without an argument this principle is self-referentially incoherent, that is, it fails by its own standards.

Maybe I've got it wrong about the Skeptical Attitude, and it is quite different from what I've described. I hope readers will have found my post interesting anyway.

Knowledge without Belief?

2009-08-05T21:54:00.002+01:00

Knowledge is a notoriously difficult concept to analyse. The common answers define knowledge as true belief plus justification, or warrant, or produced by a reliable mechanism.

It is normally assumed that belief is necessary, but I recently came across a possible counter-example at Talking Philosophy. James Garvey writes “I’m sitting in a darkened bar, listening to an ancient pianist bouncing jazz from a piano. He plays something unfamiliar and sings, ‘Oop bop sh’bam’ and inclines his ear to the audience, encouraging us in the coolest possible way to join in. ‘A klugle mop’ or something very much like that came unbidden from my lips. I am profoundly uncool, never listen to jazz, and I have no idea where that came from, but if ‘Oop bop sh’bam’ were a question, ‘A klugle mop’ is undoubtedly the answer. I knew it, I think, but I blurted it out with no conviction.”

Why should we think this is an example of knowledge? If he responded in this way simply by reflex then it is not knowledge because there is nothing there to be known, knowledge is the status given to something mental, and so there must be something mental there to be known. For example, if you taught a parrot to say “The answer is 2” any time someone said “What is the square root of 4?” the parrot would not then know that 2 is the square root of 4. If knowledge does not require belief, it at least requires a thought. So, perhaps he knew something like ‘Jazz convention stipulates that “A Kugle Mop” is the correct thing to say in these circumstances’, even though he did not believe it.

What is it that we are trying to say about the thought when we say that it is knowledge? It is to say something positive about ones mental life, that it is correctly matched up to reality, not just that it corresponds, because lucky guesses are not knowledge, but that we connected our mental life to the facts in a responsible way (what exactly that means is still a matter of considerable debate).

This means that one does not have knowledge if one disbelieves the candidate for knowledge, or even, as in this case, one does not believe. For in that situation one has failed to govern one’s mental life correctly – to stand in that positive stance known as belief towards those propositions that one has reason for.

Why then does there seem to be a strong intuition that this is knowledge? I think this may be due to the analogical use of the word ‘know’. We might say that a compass knows where north is, or the river knows the way to the sea. In these cases it is not that the compass or the river have carried out their epistemic duties it is that they act as if they knew. Likewise, in the ‘a kugle mop’ case James Garvey acts as if he knows, but we could also say, in the analogical sense, that his mouth knows ‘a kugle mop’.

Is belief in God Rational?

2009-08-03T23:14:00.001+01:00

Many people have objected to belief in God because, they say, there is not enough evidence. Given that debate surrounding most of the arguments for God’s existence still rages on this might seem a bit premature, but I shall grant it anyway. Does the failure of theists to produce a good enough argument mean that they should give up their belief in God? It is often assumed that if the arguments fail, then there is no evidence, but should evidence be limited to arguments?

This demand for evidence is usually a demand for the theist to present something that will demonstrate to those present that their belief is rational. But why think that all evidence is presentable? For example, suppose that I make the claim that I had cornflakes for breakfast, and I am asked for evidence to back up my belief. What could I present? Well, I can’t present my reason for believing. My reason is my memory of what happened at around 8am. I cannot show you my memory, it is not the sort of thing one can present. Perhaps I could take you to my home and we could find a used bowl with a few soggy cornflakes still in the bottom, and an open packet of cornflakes in the cupboard. Although this might convince you, it would not be my evidence for believing that I had cornflakes. After all, if my house burnt down at 10am my belief would not become irrational simply because all the evidence had been destroyed. It is not that my cornflake belief is without evidence; it is just that I do not have presentable evidence.

So, if all the theistic arguments fail it does not follow that the theist is without evidence, it only follows that the theist possesses no presentable evidence, no evidence that they could use to convince others. This may be regrettable, but it does not mean that the theist is irrational.

The reason that the cornflake belief is rational is because I have a faculty that give me access to the truth of the matter – my memory. Is there something similar in the case of theistic belief? Well, according to the Christian tradition God has created us with an awareness of him that allows us to know him and things about him. It might seem that this is obviously disconfirmed by the lack of belief in God, however, the Bible teaches that this faculty has been suppressed by sin, and must be awoken by the testimony of the Holy Spirit. If this account is correct then there is evidence for God’s existence, at least for some, but it is not presentable evidence.

Possible Objections:

1. One would first have to prove that this faculty exists before it is reasonable to believe things upon the basis of it.

Response: This requirement is too strict. One is not required to know anything about how memory works in order to believe the things you remember. The same goes for sight, touch etc…

2. This argument presupposes major theological claims that are the very thing being questioned, so the reasoning is circular.

Response: All that is required for the belief in God to be rational is that this account is true, not that it is known. It can be true whether or not I know anything about it. Also, since this account is plausible, any claim that there is no evidence for God’s existence will have to demonstrate that this account is false, other it is begging some important questions.

No doubt there are other objections, but I hope this gives readers something to chew over.

Common Sense Atheism?

2009-07-29T23:32:00.003+01:00

I came across a blog a while ago called Common Sense Atheism which has the following at the top of every page:

When you understand why you dismiss all the other possible gods, you will understand why I dismiss yours.

I found this a bit odd. Does this guy claim to know everyone's reason for rejecting belief in each particular god? It also seems to suggest that the only reason that theists believe in God is because they have failed to take the step of applying their thinking to their own religious beliefs. Perhaps this is true in some cases, but it is a fantasy to think that this is true in most cases.

I believe in the God who is revealed in the Bible - the Christian God. I also dismiss other gods, and I do this because the Christian God is the one true God, so if he exists no other god can exist.

How does that help me understand why the common sense atheist rejects the God of the Bible?

Empiricism's beginnings

2009-07-28T22:39:00.004+01:00

Empiricism is a theory about the source of our knowledge. According to empiricists all knowledge comes from experience, and through reasoning applied to those experiences.

The great attraction of empiricism is that it seeks to root our knowledge in the real world. We begin with items of experience and build up a picture of the world and make inferences from those experiences, constantly revising our understanding in light of new experiences.

But what about things that many people consider knowledge such as that "murder is wrong"? Should we simply discard this belief until we can come up with an argument based on experience to demonstrate that it is true. If someone told you that they had decided to carry out some experiments to see if murder was wrong wouldn't you think that they were mad? (or at least a rather etcentric philosopher?) The empiricist might simply say that we must follow our reasoning, and if a proper justification for such beliefs cannot be given then too bad.

At this point it should be a bit clearer that the empiricist, contrary to first appearances, does not begin with raw data about the world, but rather takes as a starting point a general principle about reasoning and sources of knowledge. It would be something like this:

E: One should only believe those things that are direct items of experience or can be proven using only direct items of experience.

E is a bit problematic since it is clearly not a direct item of experience, and I am totally unaware of any argument for it that rests solely on items of experience. Since I do not feel very strongly drawn to anything like E, and I am convinced that "Murder is wrong" is true, wouldn't it be more reasonable to regard my moral belief as a counter-example to E?

It is items of knowledge such as these that we all take as our starting point for reasoning, not abstract principles like E. We should simply just start with those things that seem reasonable to us, and through a process of induction and refinement perhaps we will be able to find a general principle.

Foundational Beliefs

2009-07-27T16:15:00.003+01:00

Sorry for disappearing for so long. I've had exams, and dissertation keeping me busy.

Anthony Kenny makes an interesting observation in Faith and Reason. He points out that his belief that Australia exists is held with more certainty than anything he can bring forward as evidence for that belief. For example, if asked to justify his belief he might point to the fact that it appears in atlases, that he has bought wine from Australia, that he has seen animals from Australia at the zoo, and he knows people who live there.

However, suppose he found an atlas that contained no Australia - it just had an expanse of water. Would he count this as disconfirming his belief that Australia existed? Surely not, one would simply conclude that the atlas was faulty. Or perhaps Kenny might discover that the wine he had drunk was not really from Australia. It all comes from Austria but due to a typo it now says Australia, and Austrian vineyards decided not to change it as part of a joke. One could go on suggesting ways in which the evidence may be misleading, but in none of these situations would it be rational for Kenny to abandon his belief that Australia exists.

It is clear that this has not always been the case. An eighteenth century European would have based their belief in Australia upon various pieces of evidence and the testimony of others, in such a way that undermining the evidence would give them a rational obligation to give up their belief in Australia.

What then should we conclude? Is Kenny's belief in Australia irrational because it is held more firmly than the evidence he has? That would seem to be an overly sceptical conclusion.

The response favoured by Kenny is that those beliefs that are common to all sane adults in ones society form a set of foundational beliefs, that, although not beyond epistemic appraisal, are not in need to rational support, and require compelling evidence if they are to be rejected.

There seems to be something compelling about this. It does not place too great a burden upon one to have evidence for everything one believes. However, I am concerned that it provides too much protection for deeply ingrained cultural beliefs. It is also not clear why one should stop at only those beliefs that are common to all sane adults. Perhaps the set of reasonable foundational beliefs varies not simply between cultures, but between believers.

Is it always wrong to bring God into science?

2009-04-21T00:20:00.001+01:00

Some people claim that it is inappropriate in some sense to bring God into science. Science must, they claim, operate as if naturalism where true. This is called methodological naturalism and it is supposed to be neutral concerning the claim that naturalism is true. There are a number of reasons for thinking this. Some claim that allowing God into science would provide too easy a way out of any scientific problem (“God did it”), or that it would lead to the end of science by being an end to explanation. Or perhaps it is because any claim about God is untestable. I do not wish to discuss any of these reasons here. Instead I wish to point out that methodological naturalism may not be in the truth-business, unless ontological naturalism is true.

If God exists then it is likely that there are natural events that are unexplainable except by referring to God. For example, the Bible claims that a certain quantity of water in first century Palestine became wine. This is an empirical claim, and if true, it has no natural explanation, so according to methodological naturalism that would mean it has no explanation, but this is false. If it happened, then it does have an explanation – God turned the water into wine.

One might object that there is a big IF here, but that is beside the point. Methodological naturalism is not supposed to take a position on such things, but if it cannot possibly accommodate this possibility then it is not concerned to always find the true explanation, but only purely natural ones. Maybe we simply do want to stipulate that that is what science is about, but then it is also to admit that science is not always interested in the truth.

New Atheism and the Argument from Design

2009-04-09T01:36:00.002+01:00

In The God Delusion Richard Dawkins claims that the Argument from Design is the only one still in use today.

What does he mean by this? Surely he does not mean that the other arguments are widely accpeted to have been refuted? The twientieth Century has seen much renewed discussion and defense of the Ontological Argument (Plantinga, Malcolm), and the Cosmological Argument (Craig, Pruss), plus great advances in the understanding of religious epistemology (Plantinga, Alston). Other arguments are very much alive.

Perhaps Dawkins thinks that the Argument from Design is what convinces most people that God exists, so a convincing refutation of it would take away the reason to believe from nearly all theists. I'm not sure why he would think that, maybe he has some notable examples, but from my conversations with other theists who find the Argument persuasive, I do not think it is the basis of their belief.

However, from other things Dawkins says, it seems that he thinks it is the only argument worth considering. He regularly points out that he does not think that it would have been possible to be an intellectually fulfilled atheist before Darwin, this suggests that he sees apparent Design as being the biggest and only intellectual barrier to be an atheist. This would also explain his belief that there is a conflict with the claims of modern science and religion, because if belief in God hangs on the argument from design, then an alternative explanation of apparent design not only undermines that argument, but belief in God as well. It also explains why he thinks there is no evidence for the existence of God, because the only evidence worth considering would be design.

Dawkins, intentionally or not, is creating a straw man. Christian belief is not largely or primarily based on the Argument from Design. Until Dawkins recognises this and takes a more reasonable look at belief in God his writings will come across as simply preaching to the choir.

The Morality Problem

2009-04-06T22:32:00.002+01:00

I do not think it is impossible for atheists to give a coherent justification for morality, but it seems difficult. However, I see no way that a Naturalist or the New Atheists could justify belief in moral truths (without radically altering our understanding of morality).

What is required for a Justification of Morality?

A justification of morality must not simply explain why we have the moral beliefs that we do, but it must give us a reason for thinking that there are moral truths (not just that we think there are) and that we can reasonably be expected to discover them, at least in the long run.

This means that a discussion of natural selection will not do the trick. It does not justify believing that there are moral truths, and, if there are, it is not reasonable to believe that natural selection will discover them.

A Moral truth is something like 'needlessly harming the harmless is wrong'. It seems implausible that such a thing could be known empirically. One can study instances of the needless harming of the harmless, but you will not find any 'wrongness'. Neither will you find 'rightness' in helping the poor, or anything else like that.

Perhaps the atheist could appeal to some sort of non-physical universals, but I expect Naturalists and the New Atheists would find this as repugnant as belief in God.

So, if there are these truths, where are they? And how are we able to come to know them?

What can the theist say?

The theist has an easier time. They could say that these truths exists eternally in some other realm enjoying the same sort of existence as the mathematical objects, and God has created us so that we have moral insight.

Another option is to say that morality in grounded in God himiself in some way, and that our knowledge of morality is knowledge of God.

Perhaps morality exists because God created it, and he has embedded it in his creation in some way that we can acess.

There are other options here. None of these are fully worked out theories, but hopefully you can see that there are many possible avenues. Certainly on the surface it seems that theists are going to have a much easier time with the justification problem.

How can atheists respond?

I think there are two possible responses for the atheist:

1. Bite the Bullet

That is, say that there are no moral truths. This could be a claim that morality is a fiction that has been produced by evolution to aid our survival. Alternatively it could be argued that morality is the the product of historical and cultural factors.

I do not see anything inconsistent about these types of views, but I think they are untenable. There is no argument for the conclusion that my belief that murder is wrong is the product of some non-moral process that is based premises that are more certain than the belief itself.

And although one may be able to come up with a good description of our moral truths, this approach seems to destroy all our moral obligations.

2. Argue that the theist is no better off

I think this is a preferable option. The atheist can agree, "Yes, moral truths are baffling for the atheist, but they are also baffling for the theist."

The atheist only needs an explanation for morality if the theist already has one, but on closer examination of the theists claims there appears to be holes. Take for example the Euthyphro Dilemma.

However, I do not think it is quite that easy. It looks like on the Naturalist understanding there cannot be moral truths, not just that we cannot see how there can be any. Where is wrongness and rightness on the Naturalist understanding, it seems clear that it cannot be anywhere.

The theist, on the other hand does not have this problem. There may be problems but it does not seem that there could not be an explanation.

All this means that the atheist either needs to improve their account. They must come up with a good arguement against any theist account of morality (not just complain that the accounts are incomplete) or give a Naturalistic justification of morality.

Can Atheists be Good?

2009-04-03T10:14:00.004+01:00

Yes. Emphatically.

I have been wronged by Christians many times, and also been humbled by the high moral standard of atheists.

This subject is discussed a lot by both Christians and atheists, but I think the point is being missed. There are Christians who claim that only those who believe in God can be good, but these people are confused. There is an objection in this area, but that id not it. However, I am more irritated by intelligent atheists (I'm thinking about Dawkins and Hitchens here) who spend their time discussing this objection, rather than the real objection.

What is the real objection? The objection is that although there is no bar to being moral if you do not believe in God there is no justification for morality if God does not exist. Some people try to respond to this by trying to describe why we may have moral beliefs - due to the evolutionary advantages of altruism perhaps. Such a description will not do because it does not justify believing that it is good to a certain, it only tells us why we happen to believe that. Take for example some other belief, maybe belief in God, some atheists try to describe from an evolutionary point of view why people believe in God, should that be taken to be justified by such a description?

I hope that atheists will soon stop discussing this weak version of the morality argument, and begin dealing with the real issue.

Can Christians do Science?

2009-03-24T11:56:00.000Z

I have often heard it objected that those who are not Christians cannot accept scientific work done by Christians unless those people give up their Christian beliefs while pursuing science. Why do they say this?

I think it is because they regard accepting Christian sources of knowledge, such as the Bible, as undermining the scientific endeavour. If Christians continue to believe that the Bible is the Word of God then they will not be prepared to go wherever the scientific evidence takes them.

However, this is not how we generally deal with other sources of knowledge. For example, suppose that Fred is a Mathematics student. Fred is told by one of his lecturers that a certain theorem (call it T1) is true and provable using certain axioms (call them A1 and A2). Fred regards his lecturer to be trustworthy in matters of Mathematics, and so, forms the belief that T1 is true. However, his mathematical curiosity means that he also want to figure out the proof of this theorem. So he sets about to form a proof using A1 and A2. Does his knowledge of the answer undermine his mathematical working? Should we be suspicious of any proof that he produces because his basis for believing that T1 is true is not mathematical? I see no reason that we should. We can judge his mathematical work purely on what he produces.

Likewise, a Christian is not required to choose science or Christianity. A Christian may hold certain beliefs not based on scientific evidence, but that does not mean they cannot, or will not, produce perfectly good scientific work. Neither is it a reason for anyone to dismiss their work. Science should not, and cannot, require us to abandon all other beliefs in order to take part in science. That is Scientism, not science.

How to spot a hidden religious agenda

2009-03-02T17:03:00.001Z

I recently came across this article in the New Scientist called “How to spot a hidden religious agenda” by Amanda Gefter. One might wonder what the agenda of this piece is. Perhaps it is simply a fun exercise, like “see if you can figure out this person’s religious beliefs”, much like someone writing an article telling you how to guess the age of a writer. However, the final sentence suggests that this is not simply an interesting activity, but a way of avoiding certain writers:

Those with a religious agenda will continue to disguise their true views in their effort to win supporters, so please read between the lines.

So, why would one want to avoid such writing? Perhaps the problem is that the writer is hiding something? One should try to avoid articles where a writer does not make explicit what their general aims and background beliefs are. Is that reasonable?

Firstly, such a practice would be nearly impossible, definitely impractical and opposed to good writing. People frequently write articles in newspapers, scientific journals, and philosophical journals that aim to prove or argue for very narrow and specific claims. These claims may be part of a bigger project, but that is surely irrelevant, and not necessary. Simply because the larger context is not made explicit does not disqualify the writing from being interesting or worthy of printing.

Also, writers frequently have ‘hidden’ agendas. Perhaps they are political activists, or they have the intention of winning a Nobel prize for their scientific work. Are these hidden agendas equally suspect as religious ones?

Perhaps the problem is not that the agenda is hidden, but that it is religious. Why would this be? Perhaps it is because religion does not belong in science? Some people claim that science is simply about empirical facts, and religion is about something else, so religion has no place in science. This might be reasonable if Gefter objected to writing that made explicit religious claims, but instead she is objecting to pieces that are written by those who simply have religious beliefs. The following is a list of things Gefter objects to:

* the term "scientific materialism"
* Cartesian Dualism
* Irreducible complexity
* the terms "Darwinism" or "Darwinists"
* When evolution is described as a "blind, random, undirected process"
* When cells are described as "astonishingly complex molecular machines"
* If an author wishes for "academic freedom"

It is not clear to me why these words and phrases obviously have no place in science. Could not most of them be used innocently? Or could there not be reasonable doubt that these words and phrases express legitimate positions.

Hidden agendas are irrelevant when it comes to judging the merit of a piece of work. If the writing is bad it can be shown to be so on its own merits.

There can't be just one true religion

2009-02-16T15:51:00.001Z

The first objection to Christianity that Timothy Keller looks at is the claim there cannot be one true religion. Keller does not really deal with the claim that there cannot be one true religion, but instead focuses on those who say there should not be any religions who make exclusive truth claims because this is a threat to world peace.

Keller claims that there three kinds of approaches taken by those who oppose exclusivist religions: to outlaw religion, to condemn religion and to radically privatise religion. Keller argues that none of these responses will work.

Outlaw Religion

He lists some examples of countries that have tried to ban, or control religion, so that it does not divide society or erode the power of the state. These examples are Soviet Russia, Communist China, the Khmer Rouge and Nazi Germany. None of these examples were successful at ushering peace or harmony, in fact they were responsible for much pain and suffering.

No doubt these examples are very complicated and their stance on religion is not the only relevant factor to consider, but likewise statements like ‘religion is responsible for all conflict in the world’ are equally naïve.

There are two points to make here:

The first is that it is unlikely that banning religion will be successful. When Western Christian Missionaries were banned from China it did not eradicate Christianity, instead it created a truly indigenous church which strengthened it. Religion is here to stay.

The second point is that there are plenty of examples of persecution and horrific atrocities that have not been done in the name of religion. No doubt religions have been responsible for much suffering but I see no reason to think that this suffering would not be there if we got rid of religion.

Condemn Religion

Most people I imagine would be uncomfortable about the idea of banning religion. But perhaps there is another way of controlling religion. Education and argument could be used to try and ‘water down’ religion.

This method works by pressing ideas such as “all religions are equally valid” or “religions are too culturally and historically conditioned to be ‘the truth’”. This sort of method has achieved a great deal in the West. To many people, statements such as these are simply obvious. But on closer inspection they are difficult to justify. They seem to simply ignore very real differences between religions.

The claim that religion is culturally determined is also problematic. It is no more culturally determined than being an atheist, or pluralist, or your political beliefs. There are none of these beliefs that are unlikely to be affected by when, where, and to whom, you are born. That, in itself does not undermine the belief.

Radical Privitisation

Some people argue that there is nothing wrong with religious belief, but it should be kept private. That is, you can practice your beliefs in private, but you should not let it enter into public discourse.

*The next two paragraphs are Kyle speaking for himself*

I don’t even understand people who argue for this sort of situation. I assume that they are not proposing to bar religious people from public discourse, so how are religious people supposed to behave? If they are questioned on a matter that is informed by their religious beliefs are they supposed to lie about it? Or just lie about their reasons for believing? Should we also try to stop people voting in accordance with their religious beliefs as well as speaking about them?

I don’t understand how this is meant to work in practice. I’m also not aware of any ethical framework that isn’t controversial, so I do not see why it matters that religious frameworks are controversial.

*Returning to the review*

Conclusion

Keller concludes by saying that he sympathises with those who want to eradicate religion. He says that religion has been responsible for much evil in the world and is a threat to world peace. However, removing religion will both fail and threatens to remove the best hope for peace.

The Bible teaches that Christians are not better than anyone else, in fact, Christians should often expect others to live much more moral lives than themselves. This is because the Bible teaches that you do not become a Christian by being a good person, but by trusting Jesus Christ. This should lead to humility and a desire to live a better life. The true Christian gospel is a force for peace, not division.

Lying

2009-02-11T09:36:00.004Z

I was looking at the bag of coffee the other day as I was making some and I noticed that it said that it was perfectly healthy to drink 4 cups per day. I was quite pleased because i often have 4 cups.

Then I realised that I was probably drinking double that because I have 4 mugs rather than cups. A standard cup is very small (some searching on google gave me values between 200ml and 250ml), much smaller than most cups/mugs of coffee that people drink. I'm not sure how widely known it is that standard cups are so small (Perfect in the US people are more familiar because the cup is used in cooking).

Suppose, for the sake of argument, that very few people know how big a cup is, yet nevertheless there is a standard cup. Is the coffee company lying when it says that it is healthy to drink 4 cups per day? I imagine the law would find it acceptable because they are using the technical language correctly. But surely truth telling requires more than simply uttering things that you understand to be true. It is also important that you should expect the hearers to understand what you have said.

The coffee company could easily get around this. They could put a note on the packet to indicate what size a cup is.

Is belief in God the same as belief in Santa Claus?

2009-02-04T08:45:00.003Z

In conversations with atheists I am often told that belief in God is as ridiculous as belief in Santa Claus.

There are many parallels they tell me. Most people come to believe in Santa from their parents, there is (apparently) no evidence for either, and it is based on a myth.

Is the comparison any more than superficial?

ScienceDaily refers to a study about belief in Santa Claus. It comments on how children come to realise that he does not exist, about the effect it has on them and their feelings on finding out the truth. At the end of the article is this paragraph:

Larivée and Sénéchal now want to explore a deeper question: If children attribute the same supernatural powers to Santa as they do to God, why do they stop believing in Santa, but continue their belief in God?

I would say that this observation alone is cause for hesitation before drawing too many parallels between belief in Santa and belief in God.

Many children come to realise for themselves that Santa Claus does not exist. In fact, this was my own experience; I slowly came to question the things I had been told, and so when my parents confirmed my suspicions I was not surprised. The situation with my belief in God is very different. Although I had inherited this belief from my parents, as I explored the issue for myself it solidified my belief, and it became my own.

If belief in God really was like belief in Santa Claus, then children would reject it as they got older.

The Reason for God - Intro

2009-02-03T17:09:00.003Z

A while back I promised to do a book review on Tim Keller's Reason for God - this is the start of it. If you wish to read along you might want to consider buying the book.

The book begins with a short introduction. In it Keller speaks about some of his experiences growing up and about how he set up Redeemer Presbyterian Church in New York.

He speaks about his awareness of the existing culture war between liberals and conservatives. Although this discussion is clearly written from an American point of view it is still interestiung and refreshing to read. He speaks about his confusion growing up when he was confronted by either people who were concerned for social justice, but had no concern for personal morality, or those who were concerned about personal morality yet did not care for social justice issues.

These divided cultures are driving each other to extremes. Keller lists various writings and surveys that show that both orthodox religion and anti-religious sceptics are on the rise. And each side is partly to blame for the others growth. But Keller is not looking to take sides in this culture war, that is not what true Christianity is about. Christians should not be seeking to win a culture war. We belong to another Kingdom. We live here and we should be concerned for this world, but it is not our home, and it is not where we find our security.

The reason Keller gives for writing this book is that he has met many people who have doubts about Christianity, and this is an atempt to reassess those doubts. Doubts are a very common and important part of our lives, and by doubting we often grow in knowledge. However, we must not fall into the trap of blindly trusting our doubts, they must be challenged, and themselves subjected to doubt.

The first half of the book is called the leap of doubt, and it is composed of seven chapters each on a different reason for rejecting Christianity. The secong half of the book is called the Reasons for Faith and has seven chapters on reasons to believe Christianity.

Just so readers are aware what sort of book this is: Timothy Keller is a pastor, not a philosopher, and so although it is touching on many philosophical subjects it is not written in the stule of philosophical argument. However, Keller quotes philosophers, sociologists and classic literature throughout the book. The book is not what would be classed as classical apologetics; it does not present arguments for and against God's existence. It centres around objections to Christianity that people have sincerely presented to Keller, and responses that have convinced some.

No matter what your opinion is on the subject of Christianity this will be an interesting read because it represents an insight into debates that are really going on between sceptics and believers.

I hope to be able to post a review of each chapter of this book at a rate of one per week. We will see...

Are humans logical?

2009-02-02T17:07:00.002Z

There is currently a debate going on at Stephen Law’s blog about Presuppositionalism. Law is arguing with a guy called Sye Tenby who claims that one can only justify appeals to logic if God exists.

Law and others on the blog have made the objection that they do not need to justify their use of logic, they just use it, end of story.

In this post I wish to sketch a reason for being (philosophically) worried about the use of logic.

Logic is based on a number of self-evident rules that people use to expand our knowledge. So, for example, if you know that ‘All men are mortal’ and ‘Socrates is a man’ then you can use logic to deduce that ‘Socrates is mortal’. The reason that we use the rules that we do is because there is widespread agreement among humans about what these rules should be. It is difficult to see how you could argue for these rules but since it is extremely rare for anyone to have a genuine doubt about them, it is acceptable for us to use them, and they seem to work. However, in philosophy it is important to question even very obvious things because it often leads to useful insights. For example, one should not doubt the existence of an external world in your everyday life, but in philosophy doubting such things can often lead to very fruitful discussion. Likewise, we should question logic, not in the hope of rejecting it, but in the hope of understanding it better.

If we take a look at logic it seems to get it’s justification from its widespread acceptance, but why should we expect widespread acceptance among humans to be a good guide to truth? Notice that the question is not about justifying the use of logic (people can use whatever they want), rather it is justifying the belief that logic would help us to get to the truth.

There are two ways that humans could have knowledge that the rules of logic are a good guide to truth. Firstly, it could be some sort of innate knowledge, or perhaps we innately reason in that way, that is, perhaps the human brain is wired up to reason in the way described by the rules of logic, and it is by observing human behaviour that we can come to know the rules of logic. The alternative is that we have some sort of faculty for detecting the rules of logic. Perhaps the rules of logic exist in some other realm that we are able to “see” into. My comments will apply equally to both views, but I will speak as if the former is the correct version. Either we are born with the rules hard-wired, or we are born with the capacity to find them.

If our justification for using the rules of logic that we do is that it is the rules that humans employ then why think humans would employ truth-tracking rules? Perhaps because they have survived? Quine makes this point claiming that those who have poor logic have the fortunate habit of dying out.

It is not clear that Quine is right about that, but let us suppose for a moment that he is right. Humans, by virtue of their survival, have proved that their logic is a better guide to the truth than those who have died out. This, of course, does not mean that humans are in fact remotely good at logic, it just means they are better than everyone else, but that is compatible with us being very bad. Perhaps we are at the very early stages in the development of logic. Thousands of years from now a new species will look back at humans and be amazed that they survived at all, and will chronicle how their false beliefs vastly out-numbered their true ones.

The second problem is that it is obvious that our survival proves the superiority of our logic. The thing that evolution selects for is fitness to survive not the ability to track the truth. Some will say that it is obvious that creatures with true beliefs are more likely to survive than those that have false ones, but that is not the case. What is required to survive is that you act in the right way, not that you think in the right way. Obviously our beliefs impact on the way we act (I say obvious, but epiphenomenalists will argue that mental life is a by-product, which will only make it harder for them to counter my argument), but it is not beliefs alone. Desires and intentions will also play a role.

Here is an example. Consider some creatures who have bad logic (bad logic is logic that fails to generate true conclusions when true premises are used) and it leads them to the conclusion that apples are poisonous. Also imagine that food is scarce and without eating the apples they will starve. It would seem that these creatures would probably die out. However, imagine that they have the desire to die, so they eat the apples. Creatures who have a desire to die will be good at surviving as long as they are bad at figuring out how to do it.

Why should we think that humans are a good guide to the rules of logic? The fact that w have survived does not support this conclusion because survival only proves that we act in a good way, not that we think in a good way. That is the philosophical worry about logic.

The theist has an easy answer for this worry. We are created (by an act of special creation or by some sort of guided evolution) by a personal God. God has created us to be able to engage with this world and with Him. Both of these things require us to be able to reason at least reasonably well. So, if we are created by God it is likely that human beings are a good guide to the rules of logic.

The Image of God and Regularity

2009-02-01T22:53:00.001Z

The Bible says that human beings are made in God’s image. I am not entirely sure of the full meaning of this, but it seems to have something to do with being a person. That is God is conscious, has affections, intentions and beliefs, and can act. And so can we. We are not exactly like him in any of these respects, but we are similar.

It is interesting to notice that if we are to have person hood then it is not simply important that we are created in a certain way, but that the world is also created in a certain way. In order to act one must be able to have a good idea of the consequences of that action. In a world that follows pattern (e.g. heavy objects fall towards the earth, sharp metal objects are good for cutting etc…) it is possible to predict what will happen when we do certain things, and it is therefore possible to bring about our intentions.

We are made for this world, and it for us. The creation dignifies us because it allows us to fulfil our personhood. This is one of the reasons why a world withy regularities and suffering is preferable to a world where miracles prevent all suffering. However, some will still wonder whether it is possible to have a regular world with no suffering, or if this is the only reason that there is suffering.

Happy New Year

2009-01-07T22:23:00.004Z

Sorry for my near month long absence. I've been having too much fun to blog, however, life has now returned to normal.

I had a very enjoyable Christmas and new year - I hope you did as well. I also received a book for Christmas called The Reason for God by Timothy Keller. He is the minister of a large church in New York, and a number of people had recommended this book to me. I have statred reading it and I am enjoying it a lot, so I will try to do some posts on it to pick out the interesting bits.

I also read an article by Matthew Parris in The Times called "As an atheist, I truly believe Africa needs God". In this article he claims that although he believes that God does not exist he still thinks that evangelical Christian missionaries are doing the most to help Africa, not because of their personal zeal, although he does say that that is a factor, instead it is becuase of the new ideology that it brings to the Africans.

This is a very honest and interesting article. Does it prove that God really does exist? No. But what it does do is provide a counter to many criticisms of Christianity. It counters the claim that Christianity is an out-of-date religion or that it is opposed to progress. It also causes us to doubt the secular vision of a world where religion remains private and we limit our public decision making to discussing what works; in this case religion and what works are inseparable. It is also a counter-example to the claim that the world would be better off without Christianity.

Observations like the one given by Parris can act as a reassurance to Christians and a challenge to those who wish to see religion removed from the public sphere, or simply just removed.

Problem of Evil - B-type responses

2008-12-09T15:45:00.000Z

It is now time to move on to what I am calling B-type responses to the problem of evil.

A B-type response is one that accepts that the problem of evil is evidence against the existence of God, but that it is outweighed by other evidence.

This is a particular problem for anyone who advances the evidential problem of evil. If you make a successful logical problem of evil argument then you can say that regardless of any other evidence the existence of God is impossible. However, in order to make the evidential argument persuasive you need to survey the arguments for God’s existence to see what evidence can be found there.

It is not enough, in this situation, to show that there are reasons to reject the arguments, one must show that they are a complete failure, or only add minimal support to the suggestion that God exists. For example, it is often objected that the cosmological argument requires the belief that every event has a cause or that every contingent truth has a sufficient explanation, and that these principles are not obviously true. That is so, but that does not mean that the principles are unreasonable, and that the theist could not reasonably regard the cosmological argument as evidence for God’s existence.

Those who use the problem of evil often make things very difficult for themselves. They do not simply regard the argument as a justification for their own position, but as a defeater for theistic belief as well. But this assumes that there is no evidence for theistic belief. If you want some brief examples, go here. None of these are conclusive in the sense that they are based on premises that every rational person holds, but most of them are based on reasonable premises. Any conditions placed upon a successful argument that would be sufficient to disqualify these would also disqualify the problem of evil. If one takes a step back to have a wider look at the philosophy of religion you will find that none of the arguments for or against belief in God command very broad acceptance. The arguments are fascinating and important, but neither side has yet to come up with a conclusive argument.

In conclusion, the B-type response can show that the evidential problem of evil is taking a rather blinkered approach to the issue of God’s existence – other things need to be considered. However, it is difficult to see how these arguments could decide the issue either way.

Faith - Part 2

2008-12-08T23:27:00.000Z

I want to return to an earlier subject, the subject of faith. I spoke about faith in God as being like how we talk about having faith in a person, or faith in a chair to hold us up.

Many Christians speak about faith as if it were an attribute that they had, a belief in belief. It is difficult to understand what this is, but it seems to be a kind of feeling. I think this is a misunderstanding. If God does not exist, or is not faithful, then our faith is worthless, just like faith in a broken chair or a habitual liar is worthless. Faith should not be understood as a one place attribute, but as a relationship. If you want to know whether the faith is good or bad you must look at what it is faith in.

Another definition of faith seems to come from Richard Dawkins. He defines it as that thing that takes you to a belief when you have insufficient evidence. This allows him to ask difficult questions like ‘Why do you believe in God?’ If the theist responds that they have faith he says that they have no reasons for their belief, if the theist tries to give some evidence then he says that they do not have faith. This seems to place the Christian in a difficult position. However, Dawkins simply misunderstands faith. Faith is neither the same thing as, or opposed to, having evidence. I can place faith in a chair whether or not I have evidence, or I can refrain from placing faith in the chair whether or not I have evidence. The two things are independent.

Dawkins failure to understand faith properly was demonstrated in this debate with John Lennox. Lennox asks him if he has faith in his wife, and he answers that he does and he has lots of evidence for it. Unfortunately the conversation gets moved on before they can discuss this properly, but it demonstrates how even Dawkins isn’t convinced by his own definition of faith. No doubt there are people who use the word in the way Dawkins describes it, but he completely fails to discriminate, forcing on people a definition of a word they use that they would not accept. It allows him to claim that Christians encourage a culture of uncritical thinking where certain things are above questioning. Dawkins naively paints faith as a disguise for a lack of evidence, where in fact it is a relationship grounded in God’s faithfulness.

Problem of Evil - The God of Eth Part 4

2008-12-04T13:17:00.000Z

Another problem with the God of Eth Argument is that it assumes a controversial view of the relationship between God and morality.

It assumes that there is an objective morality independent of God, and that God decides to subscribe to either the good or the evil. Another view is that morality comes from God. Some people object to this by saying that it makes morality arbitrary. This would be true if morality was decided by a human, but it is not true in the case of God. Morality stems from his essential character. This character is eternal and unchanging, and it does not differ in any possible world. Many theists also believe that mathematical objects also exist in the mind of God. This would mean that morality is only as arbitrary as mathematics.

Another objection is that morality cannot come from God because when God spoke (through the Bible or in some other way) we would not be able to judge his goodness, unless we already understood what good was, therefore goodness cannot come from God. This objection ignores that God is the creator of all; he has created us and everything else in the universe. This means that any awareness of goodness that we have does come from God because he created us and everything else.

The God of Eth argument also assumes that good and evil are two distinct entities that from an outside point of view one cannot choose between. This is the sort of view of morality that is portrayed in the Star Wars films. There is a light side and a dark side, and one must choose between them but there is no way outside of either option to choose. Within the light side, the light seems like the right choice, but within the dark side the dark seems like the right choice. On this sort of understanding of morality, morality is not connected with obligations. This goes against what most people understand by morality – that the good is what one ought to do. A god who was omniscient would know that the good is what one ought to do, so any god that did not do the good would either be ignorant, or inconsistent.

The God of Eth argument will only be compelling to those who hold this minority view about morality.

Problem of Evil - The God of Eth Part 3

2008-12-01T23:21:00.000Z

It has occurred to me that I may have been quite rash. I think there are some theodicies where it is not possible to parody them.

This is because a good parody must not only use a similar argument structure, but it must also use the same premises or undeniable premises.

For example, one response to the problem of evil is to say that evil is not something that exists in itself, rather it is the privation of good. I won’t go into the detail of this argument, but notice that it cannot be parodied. Obviously one could run the argument by stating that good is the privation of evil, but that is neither obvious nor accepted by the theist. For the parody to be successful, it must show that the theist by offering a certain argument is also committing herself to another conclusion – one that she will want to avoid. That will not happen in this case. She can simply say that the parody, unlike her argument, has a false premise.

Problem of Evil - The God of Eth Part 2

2008-11-27T13:04:00.000Z

Parodies are compelling in philosophy because they use the logical structure of one argument, and use it to prove something that is clearly false. This then forces the first person to either reject the form of argument or to accept the conclusion of the new argument.

For example, Anselm uses his ontological argument to prove that God exists, but Guanilo replies by using that argument to prove that the perfect island exists. Assuming that Guanilo is successful, it forces Anselm to either reject his argument for God or to believe that a perfect island exists.

Stephen Law seeks to do the same sort of thing to defend the Problem of Evil. He does this by showing how responses to the POE by theists can be parodied to defend an Evil God against the Problem of Good. Let’s look a bit closer.

The POE makes the claim that evil is good evidence that God does not exist. Responses to the POE either seek to show that evil is not good evidence that God does not exist, or that it is outweighed by other evidence.

So, it is clear that parodies can be made that have a similar structure can be made, but what would their conclusion be? It’s not that an Evil God exists, because responses to the POE do not attempt to show that God exists. Instead, the parodies show that the existence of good is not good evidence that the Evil God does not exist. But why should this be so unpalatable? That’s fine, the Problem of Evil doesn’t prove that the Good God doesn’t exist, but the Problem of Good doesn’t prove that the Evil God doesn’t exist either.

If someone concluded that the POE was unsuccessful it would not mean that the only intellectual option left for them was to believe that God exists, and the same goes for the Evil God and the Problem of Good.

At most Law’s argument shows that you cannot appeal to the relative amounts of good and evil in the world to tell you whether or not God is good or evil. But I am very happy to agree with that.

Problem of Evil - The God of Eth

2008-11-26T10:43:00.000Z

Stephen Law has raised an objection to many of the traditional responses to the Problem of Evil. I will not repeat his arguments here, but you can find much discussion of this on his blog.

His claim is that the responses to the POE can all be parodied and used to defend the Evil God from Problem of Good. This sort of argument is quite common in philosophy, and can be very powerful. For example, Guanilo used this type of argument in response to Anselm’s Ontological Argument for the existence of God. Anselm argued that consideration of the concept of a perfect being showed that it must exist. Guanilo then claimed that Anselm’s argument could be used to prove the existence of a perfect island. Guanilo’s argument attempts to show that Anselm’s argument is flawed even if we cannot see what the flaw is, because the form of argument allows arguments that have clearly false conclusions, like ‘there exists a perfect island’.

In the case of Law’s parodies they are powerful because they provide a criticism of so many responses in one go. There are a huge variety of responses to the POE, and Law’s response manages to deal with most of them. I do not wish to dispute the fact that many of the responses can be parodied. There are some cases that are not perfectly symmetric, as Law grants, but he also points out that in some cases they are stringer in the Evil God case, so overall balance is still maintained.

Before considering a response to this I wish to consider which of our four types of response to the POE can be parodied:

A. Theodicy responses are what Law spends most of his writing on this subject parodying, and it is difficult to see what sort theodicy would be immune to this strategy.

B. Responses that argue for the existence of God will be immune so long as they argue for a Good God. However, this will rule out the cosmological argument and perhaps others as well.

C. A response that attempted to show a theistic account gave better reasons for expecting evil than naturalism could still succeed although may still give as good an account as the Evil God hypothesis. If this sort of response is successful, then it would show that believing in some sort of God is the preferred option, but not which God.

D. The sceptical theist’s response could be easily parodied, as one would not expect to know why an Evil God permitted Good.

Parodies seem to be possible in most cases, and at least make things more difficult in others. Law claims that this shows that there is no reason to accept the Good God hypothesis over the Evil God hypothesis, so it is preferable to reject both.

In my next post in this series I will show why Law’s argument is of little concern to the theist.

Obliged to be biased?

2008-11-24T00:44:00.000Z

This is a brief break from the problem of evil posts.

I wish to discuss a claim that some people make. The claim is this: Although it acceptable, in certain circumstances, to believe things without adequate evidential support, it is not acceptable to act on those beliefs.

So, for example, it is ok for a parent to believe their daughter is a world class dancer (even if there is plenty of evidence to the contrary), however, it is not ok for that parent to use their influence over some institution to ensure their daughter gets a dance scholarship that she doesn’t deserve. I think this is obvious, and I do not wish to challenge it.

However, I do wish to present a counter-example to the general principle.

Imagine that you hear about a court case where someone, lets call him Bob, is accused of killing Fred. You have lots of spare time so you decide to attend the court to follow this case and find out as much about it as you can. When you are listening to the evidence you begin to realise that the evidence against Bob is mounting, you realise that if you take an objective view of the evidence that you will conclude that Bob is guilty. In this situation you are obliged to believe that Bob is guilty, even though it will not affect how you behave (regardless of what you decide, when you leave the courtroom you will continue with your life as it was).

Now suppose that you are Bob’s friend. You never previously thought that Bob was the sort of person who would commit murder, so when you hear about the court case you are very worried about Bob, and decide to look into it straight away. As you look at the evidence, you can see that there is a very strong case against Bob. In fact you recognise that if you were to take an objective view of the evidence that you would conclude that Bob was guilty. In this situation you are obliged to be biased towards believing that Bob is innocent even though this belief will affect your behaviour.

This is because the psychological effect upon Bob would be so terrible if he is innocent and you believe he is guilty, that you should favour believing he is innocent. It is better if you believe him innocent when he is guilty than the other way round. If he is innocent, and facing a charge of murder, he will need all the friends he can get. You could help to prove him innocent, you could visit him, or write to him, encouraging him not to give up and remind him that you are supporting him and praying for him (if that’s the sort of thing you do). You should not believe that Bob is innocent in the face of any and all evidence, but you should have a bias – how far this bias should go is debatable. Clearly, the Judge in this court case should not have a bias, which is why Judges should not sit on cases where they know the defendant.

In the first case, you are obliged to believe what the evidence is saying even though it will not affect your behaviour. Whereas, in the second case you are obliged to be biased even though the belief you form will affect your behaviour.

Therefore, it is not true, that it is always unacceptable to act on beliefs that do not have adequate evidential support.

The Problem of Evil - Theodicy

2008-11-22T15:40:00.000Z

In an earlier post I referred to four types of response to the POE. I wish to now consider A-type responses.

An A-type response is one that gives a reason for the amount of evil in the world. This sort of response is a theodicy.

Theodicy

How does this generally go? Well, the POE is the claim that the amount and distribution of evil, E, counts as evidence against the belief that God exists, G. So, the argument is that E is unlikely if G is true, but, in fact, E is true. An A-type response seeks to provide a theodicy, t, that when combined with G renders E likely.

What possible candidates are there for t? There is the Free-Will defence, or the Soul-Making theodicy, or the argument from the preservation of order, to name a few. These arguments and others have been discussed at length in many other places, and I do not wish to repeat it.

Each of the arguments are in some way flawed. Either it is not obvious that they do in fact make E likely, or they only account for certain sorts of evil. Some of these flaws could be overcome by combining theodicies. Although each theodicy on its own may fail, as long as you can show that they are compatible it may be possible to create a convincing reason for evil. Having said that, I am still not convinced that this is possible. Another problem with many of these theodicies is that although they may make E likely, they themselves are not obviously likely. So, for example, the free-will defence requires taking a particular contentious view of free-will, which would seem to make this theodicy only as likely as that theory of free-will.

Defence and Irreducible Complexity

I cannot see any promising avenues in coming up with theodicies, however, there is another similar type of response which I will call a defence. A defence is similar to a theodicy but it is not the claim to know what the reason for evil is. Instead it is simply a story that involves G and E and is true for all we know. This means that one is not required to argue for its truth, only for its plausibility.

An example of this kind of response has been used in debates about irreducible complexity. Some people claim that the eye has irreducible complexity, that is, it has several parts that work together to make it work, and if you removed any of these parts it would no longer work. This means that if the eye came about by evolution all of the features of the eye would have had to have mutated at the same time. If this is correct - if the eye really is irreducibly complex - then it causes serious problems for an unguided theory of evolution. However, responses to this have been made. The main sort of response is to give a possible series of evolutionary steps (like the one exhibited here) that could lead to an eye like ours, and this sort of response undermines the claim that the eye is unlikely to exist if the unguided theory of evolution is true.

Notice that such a response does not require the story given to be true, or even likely. When some scientist responds to the irreducible complexity claim they will not say it is wrong because they know how the eye evolved. How could they know that? Unless there was an excellent fossil record that you could use to trace the actual development of the eye. Rather, the scientist is offering a possible way for the eye to develop step by step, and the more possible routes that can be offered the better. All that matters in this case is that the story be true for all anyone knows.

Likewise, a defence used in response to the POE need only be a plausible story involving G and E. This greatly reduces the burden placed on the theist. However, this sort of response is still not my response of choice; allow it seems a lot more hopeful than the theodicy type response.

Stephen Law has advanced a counterargument against A-type responses with his ‘God of Eth’ analogy. In this he claims that any A-type response can be used to defend an Evil God as well as a good God. I will consider this in my next post before moving on to B-type responses.

Problem of Evil - Further preliminary remark

2008-11-21T23:42:00.002Z

There is one more thing i would like say before I go on to look at the various responses to the Problem of Evil. There are two types of problem, firstly, the philosophical problem, and secondly, the emotional problem.

The philsophical problem involves considering whether the existence of evil contradicts God's existence or whether the existence of evil provides good evidence for the belief that God does not exist. The emotional problem is the feeling of helplessness, or pointlessness, or unexplainability that one has when confronted with evil. This can occur when one suffers the loss of a friend or family member, or by reading about some terrible event such as the holocaust. The emotional problem is not the subject of philosophy, however, that does not mean that it does not require a response.

The philosophical problem does at times get confused with the emotional problem. Some writers speak as if it is offensive to even try to give a response to the problem of evil. That the subject matter is so horrific that to attempt to explain it away is simply to be blind to the reality of evil and shows immense disrespect to those who have suffered. In a sense this is correct.

There is a sort of response to the problem of evil that seeks to 'explain away' evil. For example, it is not uncommon to hear somone say that evil is merely analogous to a moment of silence in a piece of music. The silence seems unpleasant considered on its own, but if only we could see the big picture we would see that it is not a problem, but is in fact part of a beautiful piece of music. This sort of response is naive and offensive. Evil really is unpleasant (to put it mildly) it is awful and deeply regretable, and this is true from any perspective. The problem of evil does not just exist because we don't have the right view of evil; it really is a problem. Now, these analogies can be used in a slightly different way that is not so offensive. Sometimes the speaker merely means that, in the end, we will see that the evil had a purpose. This still recognises the reality of evil but it claims that one day we will see that it was not for nothing. Anyone who is tempted to use one of these analogies about a symphony or a tapestry needs to be careful that they are not interpretted as trying to 'explain away' evil. When Jesus heard that Lazarus had died, he wept; and this, in spite of the fact that he was fully aware that God was in control and that in the end sin and death would be defeated.

However, it is not inappropriate for philosophers to offer responses to the philosophical problem of evil. This problem concerns assessing consistency and weighing up evidence. That the subject matter is so disturbing does not change that.

What it does mean is that even if the philosophical problem of evil is resolved, the emotional prolem will remain. And offering the free-will defence (or some other philosophical response) to someone who is struggling to come to terms with the loss of a loved one is offensive. Something quite different is needed in that case.

Does this mean that Christians are fighting a losing battle? Perhaps one can deal with the intellectual problem, but the existence of evil will continue to persuade some that there is no God. I do not think so.

A friend of mine, who is a minister, told me a story about some friends of his. He is friends with a couple who were both atheists; they got on very well, and often discussed religion, however, he never came anywhere near convincing them of the truth of Christianity. This couple had a child who died before the age of one. The minister was concerned about what he might say to this couple. What would he say if they asked him to explain how he could still believe in God? He was then surprised to see the lady from this couple turn up at his church on Sunday - the first time she had ever been. When he spoke to her he asked her why she had come, and she answered "I can't believe there is no reason for this."

When it comes to the emotional problem of evil some find themselves rejecting God, whereas others have their faith strengthened or awakened. To some it is impossible to think there is an explanation for evil, to others it is impossible to think there isn't.

The Problem of Evil

2008-11-20T12:44:00.000Z

What is the problem of evil?

Traditionally the Problem of Evil (hereafter POE) has been advanced in what is now called the logically POE. This argument is the claim that there is a logical inconsistency between the existence of evil on the one hand and the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient and omni-benevolent being (hereafter when I refer to God, I will be referring to a being with these attributes) on the other. However, this argument is rather hard to motivate. For this reason many advocates have retreated to the logically weaker, but still sufficiently strong, evidential POE. The evidential POE claims that the existence of evil provides good evidence that there is no God. How does this argument go?

It is granted that God, if he exists, might permit evil, as long as he had a good reason for it. God, given the attributes that he has, has the power and inclination to stop evil, therefore, he would only allow evil if there was some overriding reason for it. God, given the attributes that he has, has the power and inclination to stop evil, therefore, he would only allow evil if there was some overriding reason for it.

1. Evil exists
2. There is no good reason for allowing the evil that we in fact see to exist
3. There, God does not exist

The claim is that the greater the amount of evil there is, then the harder it is to imagine that there might be a reason for it. If the evil that was in the world was limited to there always existing a single person with an itch they could not scratch, it would not be hard to imagine that there was some outweighing good that permitted this. However, our observations reveal that there is in fact a lot of evil.

Responses to the POE?

There are four types of response to this argument:

A. The first, and most popular response, is to deny 2 and to provide the reason for the amount of evil in the world. These reasons are called theodicies, and include examples such as the free-will defence and the soul-making defence.

B. The second response is to claim that the POE is a real problem for the classical theist. That the amount of evil in the world really is good evidence that God does not exist. However, there is other evidence that outweighs the evidence provided by the POE. Perhaps the cosmological argument, argument from morality or the argument from design.

C. The third sort of response is that the existence of evil is not very well explained by the existence of God, however, it is also not very well explained by its rivals, and naturalism in particular. This response is probably the most uncommon of the four.

D. The fourth and final type of response is to deny the justification for 2. That is the person who advances the POE seems to be inferring that ‘there is no reason for the evil we see’, from ‘I see no reason for the evil we see’. The claim is that this is a very bad inference because it is unlikely that we would be able to see why God would allow evil. This response is called ‘Sceptical Theism’.

I wish to consider each of these responses in turn to see what their merits are and if they do in fact provide an adequate response to the POE.

Distinctions among propositions

2008-11-14T14:33:00.000Z

There are three important distinctions between different kinds of propositions that philosophers frequently discuss:

a priori/a posteriori
necessary/contingent
analytic/synthetic

Many philosophers have thought that these are in fact the same distinction because a priori=necessary=analytic, and therefore that the other three are also the same. Others, like Quine, have denied that any of these distinctions exist at all. I will assume, without argument, that the distinctions do exist, however I wish to consider how they are related.

In this introductory post I will very briefly describe the three distinctions, and in future posts I will explore whether any of the distinctions are in fact the same.

A prior/a posteriori

To put it crudely, the a priori are those beliefs that we know without experience, and the a posteriori are those beliefs that we know from experience. Obviously anything that can be known can be known from experience (because you can learn anything from someone else telling you that it is true), however, the a priori are those claims that can be known simply by grasping the meaning of the position in question. For example, ‘All bachelors are unmarried’ is an a priori truth because once you understand the meaning of the words in the sentence you will realise that it is true, you need not need to carry out a survey. Other examples are ‘1+1=2’, and 'Something cannot be green all over, and red all over at the same time'.

A posteriori truths are things like 'the sky is blue' or 'all men are mortal'.

necessary/contingent

Some propositions are such that they could not fail to be true, wheras others clearly could fail to be true. For example it seems that the truths of mathematics are necessary, that is, it is impossible for them to be false. Some philosophers also claim that God's existence is necessary. Contingent propositions on the other hand are ones thar could have been false like 'Gordon Brown is the Prime Minister'.

analytic/synthetic

The final distinction concerns the diference between those prositions are are true in virtue of the definitions of their terms, and those that are not. For example 'All red objects are coloured' is simply true by definition, and so is an analytic truth. These are truths that help you to understand the definitions of words. Synthetic propositions on the other hand are not true by definition, for example, 'all gold spheres are less than one mile wide', this is true (as far as we know) but it is not true in virtue of the definitions of the words involved.

I hope it obvious from these brief explanations why many people have thought that these distinctions are in fact the same. However, I wish to show in future posts that these distinctions are different.

Faith - Part 1

2008-11-10T00:06:00.002Z

This is the first post on my blog. I intend mostly to write about philosophy, but other things may appear as well.

I want to start by doing some posts on faith. I will talk about faith from a Christian perspective. There are many different perspectives about what faith is, and about what role it should play, if any, in our lives. This proliferation of views leads to much confusion, because people often think they are talking about the same thing, when in fact they are talking about very different things. So, to begin, I wish to mention three ways that I will use the word faith.

Faith - everyday usage

The first is the ordinary everyday sense of the word faith. It means something like trust, you have faith in something else that it is reliable or trustworthy or faithful. When my wife tells me something, I have faith in her, that she will tell me the truth. When I walk across a bridge it means I have faith in the bridge that it will hold me up. There are two important aspects of this use of the word faith. 1. It is in something else; 2. It is in a certain respect. I may have faith in my wife to tell me the truth, but I do not have faith that she will be able to hold me up, because I am too heavy for her. If you have faith in something else you are making the judgement that that thing is faithful in the respect in which you have faith in it.

Faith - faith in God

The second use of the word faith is to describe faith in God. This is closely related to the first use because it describes a particular instantiation of that type of faith. The object of this faith is God, and it is in every respect. That is, God is faithful in every respect and we should have faith in him in every respect. This means believing what he has said and trusting that he can carry it out.

Faith - The Christain Faith

The third and final use of the word faith I wish to mention here is faith with a capital ‘F’. Faith can be used to refer to a religion, or religion in general. This reflects the central role that faith plays in many of the worlds religions. However, the word faith is used in a very different sense in each religion, and so the commonality is only superficial. However, it is the case that faith in God plays a very important role in Christianity, and so referring to the religion as the Christian Faith is helpful.

In future posts I will look at some other uses of the word faith and consider their significance. I will be particularly interested in Richard Dawkin’s claim that faith is belief without evidence.